Complementarity Between STPvote and End-to-End Verifiable Voting (E2E-V)
Complementarity Between STPvote and End-to-End Verifiable Voting (E2E-V)
I. Two Approaches: Structural Governance vs. Cryptographic Verification
In the field of electronic voting research, End-to-End Verifiable Voting (E2E-V), promoted by institutions such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), represents a cryptographic approach to building trust in election systems.
The core objectives of E2E-V include:
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Allowing voters to verify that their ballot was cast as intended
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Ensuring that ballots are recorded as cast
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Enabling public verification that votes are tallied as recorded
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Using cryptographic techniques such as encryption, zero-knowledge proofs, and mixnets
The philosophical foundation of E2E-V may be summarized as:
Trust established through mathematical proof.
By contrast, the Separation of Three Powers Electronic Voting System (STPvote) follows a different architectural path.
The core features of STPvote include:
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Structural separation of registration authority, transmission authority, and computation authority
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Institutional and physical isolation of critical powers
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Public access to downloadable voting data for independent tally verification
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Retention of paper ballots as the final legal reference
The philosophical foundation of STPvote may be summarized as:
No single power should be the center of trust.
II. Different Layers of Risk Control
E2E-V primarily addresses:
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How to prove that votes have not been altered
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How to enable public mathematical verification of results
STPvote primarily addresses:
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How to prevent systemic manipulation caused by concentration of power
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How to reduce attack success probability at the structural level
In other words:
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E2E-V is a mechanism for verifying correctness.
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STPvote is a framework for preventing power concentration risk.
Their focus areas differ, but they are not in conflict.
III. Structural Defense + Cryptographic Verification = Dual-Layer Security
When combined, the two systems may form a dual-layer protection model:
Layer 1: Structural Separation (STPvote)
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Reduces centralized attack surfaces
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Distributes internal manipulation risk
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Increases the cost of coordinated system compromise
Layer 2: Cryptographic Verifiability (E2E-V)
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Provides mathematical proof that data has not been altered
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Enables public independent verification
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Ensures auditability at scale
Such a combined structure implies:
Even if one layer is compromised, an independent layer must still be overcome.
This mirrors constitutional governance models where:
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Separation of powers prevents abuse
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Judicial review verifies legality
The two mechanisms operate in parallel rather than as substitutes.
IV. The Anchoring Role of Paper Ballots
STPvote emphasizes retaining paper ballots as the final legal anchor.
Within this framework:
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The electronic system enhances transparency and efficiency
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Paper ballots provide a tangible, legally grounded audit reference
This design may increase public confidence, particularly among communities that prefer physical ballot assurance, while also reinforcing the electronic verification mechanisms of E2E-V with a real-world fallback.
V. Future Direction: Integrating Structure and Cryptography
The future of electronic voting should not be framed as “institutional design versus mathematics,” but rather as:
Structural separation + cryptographic verification + physical audit backup.
STPvote does not seek to replace E2E-V.
Instead, it aims to provide a structural governance layer that can complement cryptographic verification systems.
E2E-V answers the question:
“How do we prove the result is correct?”
STPvote addresses a different question:
“How do we prevent any single authority from controlling the system in the first place?”
Together, these approaches may contribute to the development of next-generation high-trust election architectures.
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